Canadian Government Executive - Volume 23 - Issue 09

12 / Canadian Government Executive // December 2017 Procurement unfold. In most major procurements today, four major actors can be identified: the government, the civil service, industry and the military. Each group has subtle differ- ences in objectives and tolerances of risk that alter how programs unfold. Examples from major acquisition programs will be used, including the Heavy Lift Helicopter program, the Canadian Surface Combatant and the various iterations of the CF-18 re- placement program. The Actors: The Political Leadership The government, or more specifically, the political leadership, obviously plays a disproportionate role in any major pro- curement: they can shape the program’s features, and have ultimate authority on its progress through the system. They can expedite a program, slow it down, or even cancel it, if it suits their political need. All of this can change dramatically based on their circumstances. Rarely do governing parties see a politi- cal advantage in defence activities; rather, their primary concern seems to be avoid- ing controversies on the file. Controversy may be generated by delays, cost over- runs, impropriety in the selection process (whether real or imagined), and inade- quate equipment for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). The relative importance of these concerns are rarely static between successive governments. Even within a sin- gle term, a governing party’s priorities and objectives may shift upon circumstances. For example, upon entering into office, the Conservative Party was concerned about the threat faced by the CAF in Af- ghanistan and their inadequate equip- ment. It rushed through a number of major procurements projects, such as the 2007 Tank Replacement program (Leopard 2) and the C-17 Strategic Airlift acquisition program. However, the Conservatives’ policies were short-lived and outside the norm of Canadian politics. Governing par- ties since the 1960s have tended to see de- fence as a political liability, rather than an opportunity. Indeed, as its time in office progressed, the Conservative Party adopt- ed a more conventional outlook and, by its final years, it was actively slowing major procurements in order to meet its deficit reduction efforts. Considering the government’s limited interest in this area, it should not be a sur- prise that there is little appetite for risk, especially in the areas of cost overruns, de- lays and process failure. One way this has manifested itself is the wider application of competitions to resolve procurement programs, which are viewed as delivering better outcomes with more integrity than sole-sourced programs. As we will discuss later, this has become an issue for many programs. The Civil Service This largely refers to members of Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC), as well as some civilian members of the Department of National Defence. They are primarily tasked with overseeing manage- ment of the government’s procurement policies and ensuring that all procurement activity meets the established legal and policy guidelines, in a fair, open and trans- parent manner. Framed a different way, the implementation and administration of the procurement process is their primary concern. Taken together, this gives the im- pression amongst some other stakeholders that the civil service prioritizes process above outcomes. The civil service’s approach to risk is sig- nificantly different from the political lead- ership. Rather than avoid it altogether, it attempts to mitigate it completely through process. Conventions, experiences and precedents from previous efforts help to improve new programs. In practice how- ever, the strict adherence to regulation and process, despite its obvious defects, often result in poorer outcomes. In many cases, policies implemented ostensibly to mini- mize risk may actually exacerbate it. One example can be seen in the prequal- ification of potential competitors before a Request for Proposal is issued. In some cases for a very large and complex project, such as the privatization of the Atomic En- ergy Canada Limited’s facilities, an exten- sive prequalification effort can ensure that bidders are able to meet all of the varied requirements. However for most major procurements within DND, multiple pre- qualifications needlessly delay projects to little benefit, and subsequently delay what should be a straightforward acquisition and the introduction into service of an im- portant capability. The Military The most significant difference between defence procurements and ones under- taken for the civilian arms of government is the involvement of the Canadian Armed Forces. While other procurements also fea- ture strong stakeholder presence, they do not possess such a unique culture as the CAF. The military ethos prioritizes service to country above self, as well as loyalty to superiors, peers and subordinates through the principled and (at times) courageous discharge of their duties. This brings a very different dynamic to how procurements unfold. Furthermore the military have a critical role in the process, due to their responsibility to set requirements for pro- curements. This often incorporates highly technical and classified information, which only Canadian Forces members can effec- tively handle. The CAF’s primary focus is to ensure that personnel in the field are properly equipped for the missions they are tasked to execute. One potential problem with this approach is that its representatives may pursue this objective above every- thing else, a circumstance which became a problem in the immediate post WWII era. However, various reorganizations since the 1960s, austere fiscal environments, and changing technical and strategic consid- erations have drastically altered how the CAF culture deals with programs. Conse- quently, affordability has become a key fo- cus; a program that is too costly is unlikely to be approved or will draw resources from other programs in an austere budget envi- ronment. That said, there is also the tendency to “gold plate” programs: capability improve- ments that would allow a platform to un-